This article undertakes an in-depth investigation into the foundational ontological tension between reason (as a normative, universal, and a priori ground) and will (as a concrete, instituting, and political act), positing them as two conflicting and irreconcilable foundations for the legal order. By centering its analysis on Martin Loughlin's intellectual project of "Political Jurisprudence," this study formulates and defends the central thesis that this tension is not a theoretical problem to be resolved through abstract formulas, but rather a dynamic, permanent, and constitutive antinomy at the very core of modern politico-legal life.



To substantiate this claim and illustrate the dimensions of this conflict, the article anatomizes the intellectual debate between Loughlin and one of his most trenchant critics, Lars Vinx. The principal argument herein is that Vinx's critique—rooted in the liberal-normativist analytical tradition and its insistence on "theoretical coherence" as an absolute criterion—is incapable of grasping the essence of Loughlin's project due to a fundamental and insurmountable methodological incongruity. In a two-pronged attack, Vinx first attempts to undermine the necessity of Loughlin's theory by accusing him of a "straw man" fallacy. Subsequently, by ensnaring him in a false and inescapable dilemma—a forced choice between a domesticated "Rousseauian" rationalism and a radical "Schmittian" decisionism—he seeks to expose the project as internally contradictory.



Through a meticulous deconstruction of both stages of this attack, this paper demonstrates that what Vinx identifies as "incoherence" is not a theoretical deficiency in Loughlin's project, but rather an honest reflection of the inherently paradoxical, dialectical, and "tragic" character of the politico-legal realm itself. This is a reality that analytical reason, by virtue of its intrinsic commitment to clarity, non-contradiction, and transparency, is structurally unable to comprehend. In its final step, the article engages with Panu Minkkinen's immanent and sympathetic critique—which highlights the tragic conflict between "science" (as a detached act of understanding) and "politics" (as a partisan, power-oriented act) within Loughlin's project itself. It concludes that "Political Jurisprudence," in the final analysis, is an invitation for an epistemological shift: a transition from a "jurisprudence of innocence," which seeks refuge from contingency in abstract formulas, to a "jurisprudence of experience" that possesses the theoretical courage to confront the complex, concrete, tension-ridden, and tragic reality of human existence.