Philosophical hermeneutics, particularly as developed by Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer, conceives human beings as fundamentally interpretive creatures. From this perspective, interpretation is not merely a method for resolving textual ambiguities or facilitating understanding—it constitutes an essential and inescapable aspect of understanding itself. Every act of understanding is simultaneously an act of interpretation, intrinsically shaped by the interpreter's temporal, cultural, and situational context. Consequently, the interpretation of past legal texts is inevitably influenced by present circumstances, rendering understanding an ongoing process of reinterpretation through application.
In the realm of constitutional law, this hermeneutic approach demands that legal interpretation engage with the political, social, and ethical realities of its time. Such an interpretive method navigates the tension between pragmatic considerations and idealistic aspirations, striving to preserve the normative foundations of the constitution while responding to evolving societal needs. Drawing on the philosophical insights of hermeneutics and Ronald Dworkin’s interpretive legal theory, this article examines the inherently interpretive nature of constitutional law.
The second part of the article argues that this interpretive approach positions legal actors as responsible agents, guided by principles that protect fundamental rights and integrate external realities into the legal framework. This dynamic, pluralistic mode of interpretation aligns with the rule of law and promotes coherence within the constitutional legal order.